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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Tax Law
I. COURT EXTENDS BOUNDARIES OF POWER
To TAX INCOME OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission' the South Carolina
Supreme Court explored the limits of modem Due Process Clause2 and
Commerce Clause3 jurisprudence by holding constitutional the imposition of
a tax upon the income earned from a licensee's use of a trademark, even
though the licensor is not physically present in the state. This decision
suggests that any use of intangible property in South Carolina, whether by the
owner of the property or by others, subjects the income from that property to
taxation. For example, even though Tom Clancy lives in another state, he
might be subject to South Carolina taxation on any income he receives from
South Carolina sales of Red Storm Rising.' The question Geoffrey raises is
whether the court's ruling exceeds the boundaries of due process and the
Commerce Clause.
Geoffrey, Inc. was organized in Delaware as a trademark management
and holding company to manage the trademarks of Toys "R" Us.' It has no
physical presence or operations in any other state.6 Rather, it licenses the
Toys "R" Us name to its corporate parent in consideration for a royalty of one
percent of the net sales or services rendered under the agreement.7 Toys "R"
Us did not begin doing business in South Carolina until October 1985, more
than a year after the August 1984 license agreement was made.'
Toys "R" Us deducted the royalty payments on its 1986 and 1987 South
Carolina income tax returns. After initially denying the deduction, the Tax
Commission changed its position and allowed the deduction in favor of
1. __ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 13, cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. TOM CLANCY, RED STORM RISING (Berkley 1986).
5. Gordon W. Stewart, The Geoffrey Decision's Constitutional Problems, 5 STATE TAX
NOTES 420,420 (Aug. 23, 1993). Delaware specially exempts such trademark management and
holding companies from taxation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b) (8) (Supp. 1992).
6. Petition for Writ of Cert. at 3. Note that the Petition is entitled Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
CarolinaDep't of Revenue and Taxation because of the South Carolina Government Restructuring
Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-30-95 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). See also Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C.
at _, 437 S.E.2d at 15 (noting that Geoffrey has no physical presence in South Carolina).
7. Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
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assessing an income tax against Geoffrey itself.9 Geoffrey paid the tax
assessments and filed an action for refund in the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas, asserting that it did not have a sufficient nexus and that it did
not do business in South Carolina. The court found for the Tax Commission,
and Geoffrey appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court."0
Following the United States Supreme Court's two-part analysis of state
taxation issues under the Constitution,1 the court found that jurisdiction to
tax Geoffrey was proper under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
The court found that the trademark agreement supplied the "minimum
connection" required by the Due Process Clause. By licensing its trademark
to Toys "R" Us for use in other states and by receiving income under that
agreement, Geoffrey purposely availed itself of the economic benefits of those
states and established a connection with them.12
Additionally, the court found that Geoffrey had intangible property
present in South Carolina. The court based its holding upon the creation of
accounts receivable for Geoffrey after each South Carolina sale and the trial
judge's finding that the license agreement was a franchise located in South
Carolina. 3 The court rejected Geoffrey's assertion that, under the
doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam, its intangibles were located not in
South Carolina but in Delaware.14  Rather, the court reasoned that the
trademark is located in South Carolina and other states through its use in each
state. 15
9. Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
10. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
11. The framework was recently set forth in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp,
- U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 173 (1993). The
first part of the test focuses on the Due Process Clause's concern with "the fundamental fairness
of governmental activity)." Id. at _, 112 S.Ct. at 1913. The test requires (1) "some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax," and (2) that the "income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related
to values connected with the taxing State." Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 16
(quoting Quill, - U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 1909-10).
The second part of the test addresses the Commerce Clause's concern "about the effects of
state regulation on the national economy." Quill, - U.S. at _, 112 S.C. at 1913. A tax will
be sustained so long as: (1) the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing state, (2) the tax is fairly apportioned, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the state. Id. at _, 112
S. Ct. at 1912 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
12. Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
13. Id. at _,437 S.E.2d at 16.
14. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 17. Mobilia sequunturpersonam means literally "[m]ovables
follow the [law of the] person." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (6th ed. 1990).
15. See Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 17.
1994]
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The court also upheld the tax as rationally related to the benefits
Geoffrey derived from the state. 16 Because Geoffrey received income from
customers in South Carolina, Geoffrey received benefits from the orderly
society provided by South Carolina. The tax is rationally related to those
benefits because South Carolina only taxes the amounts earned within its
borders17 as determined by the statutory apportionment formula.
Finally, the court upheld the tax under the Commerce Clause. Geoffrey
asserted that the state could not assess any taxes because physical presence is
required for substantial nexus. 8 The court rejected Geoffrey's argument,
finding it well settled that the "presence of intangible property alone is
sufficient to establish nexus." 19 The court thought that Geoffrey established
a substantial nexus with the state by entering into and receiving money from
the license agreement.2'
Under the first part of the due process test, South Carolina can assert
jurisdiction over Geoffrey only if the corporation has some minimum
connection with South Carolina. Recent Supreme Court decisions evaluate
minimum connection in terms of "whether a commercial actor's efforts are
'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State." 21 In Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, ' the Supreme Court stated that "[tjhe
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State."'
If the reasoning from Asahi applies, Geoffrey does not have a minimum
connection with South Carolina. Geoffrey merely introduced the trademark
into the stream of commerce when it entered the license agreement with Toys
"R" Us.24 Toys "R" Us, a separate legal entity, created the minimum
connection with South Carolina. Even if Geoffrey was aware that Toys "R"
Us would use the trademark in other states, simple awareness that the product
might end up in a particular state is not an act purposefully directed toward
16. Id. at ,437 S.E.2d at 17.
17. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 18.
18. The court considered only the question of substantial nexus. "Our Due Process analysis
of the benefits conferred upon Geoffrey applies with equal force [under the Commerce Clause]
and need not be repeated. Moreover, Geoffrey raised no constitutional claim that the challenged
tax is not fairly apportioned or discriminates against interstate commerce." Id. at __, 437
S.E.2d at 18 n.5.
19. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 18 (citing American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue
Dep't, 605 P.2d 251, 255 (N.M. 1979)).
20. Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
21. E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel Heitkamp, _ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1910
(1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 173 (1993) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476 (1985)).
22. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
23. Id. at 112.
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those states." Finally, Toys "R" Us was not doing business in South
Carolina when the license agreement was executed.
As noted above, the Asahi standard requires some act purposefully
directed toward the forum state. Justice O'Connor cited several examples of
a purposeful act, such as "advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State."I In each example, the corporation actively seeks to enjoy the
benefits of a particular state's market. By design, Geoffrey is a passive
corporation. The extent of its purposeful act was licensing its trademark to
Toys "R" Us, which controlled the later use of the trademark.
Although the principles applied in Asahi should apply in all situations, the
Court was addressing due process principles regarding the sale of tangible
property in a non-tax situation. Due process principles applying to the sale of
intangible property may be different. However, Justice O'Connor noted that
Asahi "did not create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought
its valves to California."27 Although the Court is still focusing on purposeful
acts related to the sale of tangible property, this statement of the rule seems
easily transferred to selling intangible property. By its corporate nature,
Geoffrey did not "create, control, or employ" the system that used the
trademark in South Carolina. Geoffrey merely acquiesced in its parent's use
of the trademark.
Yet, Geoffrey's corporate nature is somewhat troubling.2" Although
Geoffrey and Toys "R" Us are separate corporate entities, asserting that
Geoffrey is truly independent of its parent defies reality. Asahi considered
only an independent distributor in a non-tax situation;29 the Court did not
25. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112; see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §
3.11 (1985) (noting that "mere acquiescence in the event that... invok[es] the protection of the
forum's law" is insufficientfor minimum contacts) (discussingKulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84 (1978)).
26. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
27. Id.
28. The Tax Commission originally disallowed a deduction to Toys "R" Us for the license
fee paid to Geoffrey, challenging Geoffrey as "a paper corporation." Petition for Writ of Cert.
at 6 (citing Record at 219). After Geoffrey challenged this ruling, the Tax Commission accepted
Geoffrey's separate corporate status and instead assessed the tax directly against Geoffrey based
upon the income earned under the license agreement. Id.
Subsequently, the South Carolina Supreme Court commented on the use of the corporate
structure to produce "nowhere" income that escapes all state income taxation. Geoffrey, Inc.,
S.C. at _ n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 15 n.1. This observation suggests that the Tax Commission
and the supreme court were concerned with finding a way around Geoffrey's corporate structure.
29. A lower court has opined that corporations can indeed "organize their operations to avoid
selected jurisdictions." Bond v. Octagon Process, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 710, 714 n.2 (M.D. Ga.
1990) (citing JOHN J. COUthn ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 137 (5th ed. 1989)), aff'd, 926 F.2d
1994] TAX LAW
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consider whether a related corporation could establish jurisdiction. While it
is true, in a sense, that Toys "R" Us is the distributor of Geoffrey's
"product," Geoffrey is not independent of Toys "R" Us.
Due process should consider not only the legal but also the economic
realities of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Because asserting jurisdiction
to tax the income of a wholly owned subsidiary through the acts of its parent
is an exercise of "legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction,"30 exercising
jurisdiction over a subsidiary based on the parent's purposeful acts probably
is within the spirit of due process. Of course, this approach contemplates
some form of piercing Geoffrey's corporate veil, even though Geoffrey is a
separate, legal entity under Delaware law.31  The Supreme Court has
approved taxing the income of out-of-state subsidiaries forming part of a
unitary business operating within the state, even though such taxation is a
lesser form of veil-piercing.32
Analyzing whether the multi-state operations of Geoffrey and Toys "R"
Us constitute a unitary business seems appropriate. The court did not address
the issue, possibly because the South Carolina General Assembly apparently
has not addressed the issue by statute. Further, the Tax Commission has
enacted regulations treating every corporation as a separate entity and applying
unitary taxation only to divisions under the corporate veil of a single entity.33
The question that arises is whether, because of the Due Process Clause's
concern with notice and fair play, South Carolina must have statutory or
regulatory authority to exercise unitary taxation over out-of-state subsidiar-
1573 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2855 (1991). However, the court made its observation
while evaluating the propriety of exercising adjudicative jurisdiction over a corporation based on
the actions of an independent distributor.
30. Quill Corp., _ U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and
Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Legislative jurisdiction is in
contrast to adjudicative jurisdiction, such as tort liability, which was the issue in Asahi. See id.
At least three Justices believe that due process standards for adjudicative and legislative
jurisdiction may differ at the margin.
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b) (8) (Supp. 1992).
32. See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 8.12 (2d
ed. 1993) The Supreme Court has applied unitary taxation in a recent tax apportionment case.
See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, _ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
Unitary taxation appears to be the starting point for all apportionment cases. See 1 HELLERSTEIN
& HELLERSTEIN, 8.13[l].
Unitary taxation allows the tax authority to include the income from out-of-state entities in
the apportionable income if the in-state and out-of-state entities are related functionally. The
Court has set forth three factors for determining a unitary business: (1) functional integration, (2)
centralization of management, and (3) economies of scale. Allied-Signal, - U.S. at _, 112
S. Ct. at 2260 (citing Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 179
(1983). A flow of goods between the entities is not required; a flow of value is sufficient. Id.
at _, 112 S.Ct. at 2261 (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 178).
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ies34  In the absence of legislative authorization for unitary taxation,
exercising jurisdiction over an out-of-state subsidiary with no direct nexus with
the state may violate the requirement of notice and the spirit of fair play.
To support jurisdiction over Geoffrey, the South Carolina Supreme Court,
in a novel and far-reaching approach, used accounts receivable" and an
undisputed franchise to support South Carolina's jurisdiction over Geoffrey."
The court found that Geoffrey's intangible property was present in South
Carolina through the acts of Toys "R" Us. 37  Citing Virginia v. Imperial
Coal Sales Co. ,38 the court found that Toys "R" Us's use of these intangible
assets gave Geoffrey the required minimum connection with the state. Thus,
through the acts of a separate, although related entity, Geoffrey has property
present within South Carolina. The property is then apportioned to the state,
giving the state jurisdiction.
The problem with this analysis is that Imperial Coal addressed the
Commerce Clause implications of a property tax imposed on a company
having a Virginia domicile, but no tangible property within the state.
39
Imperial Coal represents that taxes may be levied on accounts receivable.
However, the tax was levied on a corporation already domiciled in Virginia;
the location of the company's accounts receivable followed the corporate
domicile.'
Geoffrey itself is not domiciled or operating in South Carolina; only Toys
"R" Us is. Even without analyzing the unitary business, the court apparently
used a triangular analysis to support jurisdiction over Geoffrey. Because
Geoffrey licensed its intangibles to Toys "R" Us, which then used the
34. See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, 8.12[l] (noting that courts have
disagreed on the requirement for explicitly permitting unitary taxation; also noting that, when
Maine and Massachusetts held that unitary taxation must be explicitly allowed, the respective state
legislatures overruled the holdings).
It seems sensible that the presence or absence of a unitary taxing statute may be comparable
to the authority given and the notice provided by a state long-arm statute for adjudicative
purposes. That is, without such a statute, jurisdiction fails. See FRiEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 25, § 3.12.
35. See William J. Quirk, Supreme Court Rules in Geoffrey That Delaware Company is
Taxable, in 5 STATE TAX NOTES 145, 146 (July 19, 1993).
36. See Geoffrey, Inc., __ S.C. at , 437 S.E.2d at 16. The characterizationof the license
agreement as a franchise agreement was seemingly made without much ado. Id. at __ n.2, 437
S.E.2d at 16 n.2 (noting that Geoffrey did not challenge the trial judge's finding of a franchise).
This might be important because a franchisor takes a more active role in the franchisee's
business. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 422 (noting that the term "franchise" was not in the
briefs and that Geoffrey argued against the substance of that characterization).
37. Geoffrey, Inc., _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
38. 293 U.S. 15 (1934).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 19.
19941
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intangibles in South Carolina, the state can apportion the intangibles back to
Geoffrey and obtain jurisdiction over the company.
After citing Imperial Coal as authority for the proposition that accounts
receivable sustain jurisdiction, the Geoffrey court rejected Imperial Coal's
support of the older rule that intangibles are located at the owner's domicile.
Rather, the court followed the modem rule that intangibles may be taxed by
apportionment. 4 By doing so, the court encountered the same problem as
that presented by its use of Imperial Coal: Rules used for constitutionally
taxing entities over which the state has otherwise acquired jurisdiction do not
necessarily create constitutional jurisdiction. By apportioning intangibles to
support jurisdiction rather than focusing on jurisdiction itself, the court skirts
the issue of upon what basis South Carolina asserts its jurisdiction.
An example of the jurisdiction problem is demonstrated by the court's use
of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes 42 as authority for jurisdiction
by apportionment. Mobil Oil addressed the apportionment of intangibles as
part of Mobil's wholesale and retail marketing of petroleum in Vermont; that
is, Mobil otherwise purposefully availed itself of Vermont's benefits.43
Mobil Oil did not decide whether the apportionment of intangibles to Vermont
gives that state jurisdiction to tax out-of-state dividends paid to Mobil. Rather,
Mobil Oil decided that Vermont can include out-of-state intangibles as part of
Mobil's unitary tax base. Mobil Oil never addressed the first issue.
The second part of the Court's due process analysis, that there must be
a rational relationship to values connected with the taxing state, might be
similar to the adjudicative due process requirement of "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' Although Geoffrey might have sufficient
minimum contacts to justify the exercise of jurisdiction, the benefits received
might not support a tax based on the value.4" Assuming Geoffrey has some
minimal contact, it seemingly receives some benefit from South Carolina
through the income it receives from South Carolina customers. Through
apportionment, South Carolina taxes only those benefits Geoffrey receives
41. Geoffrey,Inc., _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 17. Previously the court ruled that a
copyright was allocated to the taxpayer's domicile. Pendarvis v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
285 S.C. 381, 329 S.E.2d 766 (1985); see also Dean A. Eichelberger, Note, Situs of Copyrights
Determined, 38 S.C. L. REV. 207 (1986). Seemingly, a copyright is similar to Geoffrey's
trademark. However, Geoffrey did not discuss Pendarvis; Pendarvis' continuing validity seems
questionable.
42. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
43. Id. at 428. It may be noteworthy that Mobil Oil addressed the issue of including dividends
from out-of-state subsidiaries in the apportionment factor.
44. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).




Published by Scholar Commons,
TAX LAW
from the state.46 The question is how substantial the benefit must be to
support the tax.
Although due process does not require physical presence, the* Commerce
Clause requirement of physical presence is unclear. In Quill, while holding
that physical presence is required to assess a use tax under the substantial
nexus requirement, the Supreme Court also noted that such a requirement
never was applied to other taxes. The Supreme Court required it for use taxes
because the physical presence rule created substantial reliance in the mail-order
industry. 47
The Court's approach in Quill and Allied-Signal suggests that in the
absence of any congressional action, the focus is on settled expectations and
reliance interests. This focus is consistent with the Commerce Clause's
concern with the burden of state acts on the national economy.4" However,
the Court's focus on reliance interests under the Commerce Clause seems
somewhat narrow, focusing on an industry rather than all commerce.
It is not clear whether Geoffrey has any legitimate reliance interests
affected by South Carolina's ruling. Conceivably, while physical presence has
never been articulated for income taxes, taxpayers may have relied on a
physical presence requirement because the taxpayers apparently had physical
presence in all of the Court's previous tax decisions.49 Additionally, given
its apparent desire to have Congress exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to settle this matter, the Court might use reliance on physical presence
as a less-complex answer to this very complex question."0
If Geoffrey did not legitimately rely on physical presence, which it
probably did not, the strength of its position is unclear. Relying on the
Delaware taxing scheme would not protect Geoffrey in any other state.
Geoffrey might assert that it relied on the statutory scheme of South Carolina
and that the absence of a unitary statute is a legitimate interest. However,
these assertions seem somewhat weak.
Considering the uncertainty in this area, along with the Court's desire for
Congress to act, it is difficult to evaluate Geoffrey's position under the
Commerce Clause. Several justices have suggested that, in the absence of
reliance interests, the states have broad powers of taxation under the
46. See Geoffrey, Inc., __ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
47. See Quill, __ U.S. at_, 112 S. Ct. at 1916.
48. Id. __, 112 S.Ct. at 1913. See also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,__
U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Quill, _ U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 1914; see also Petition for Writ of Cert.
at 11-12 ("Indeed, the Court has never held in any state tax case that the nexus requirement of
the Commerce Clause can be satisfied in the absence of a taxpayer's physical presence in the
state.").
50. See Quill, __ U.S. at n.10, 112 S. Ct. at 1916 n.10 ("The precise allocationof such
burdens is better resolved Congress rather than this Court.").
1994]
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Commerce Clause.51 If the Tax Commission clears the due process hurdle,
the Commerce Clause might provide no bar to asserting jurisdiction over
Geoffrey.
In conclusion, the South Carolina Supreme Court's view is the better view
conceptually. 2 Economic presence, rather than physical presence, better
reflects current financial and economic realities. In a limited sense, economic
presence is part of the test under the Due Process Clause. The court correctly
sensed that the economic relationship between Geoffrey and its parent suggest
that the company should be subject to the state's jurisdiction.
Yet, the court never satisfactorily answers the question of how South
Carolina obtains jurisdiction over Geoffrey. The court asserts that Geoffrey
gains an economic presence in South Carolina simply by licensing its
trademark to Toys "R" Us for use in other states. However, even though it
is related to Geoffrey, Toys "R" Us still is a separate corporation.
The answer to the court's dilemma probably lies in the unitary business
analysis. Under this analysis, a state can tax a corporation having no presence
in the taxing state if the corporation is part of a unitary business connected to
the state. However, because South Carolina apparently has no unitary
business statute, South Carolina's assertion of jurisdiction over Geoffrey might
violate the due process requirements of notice and fair warning.
After finding Geoffrey has economic presence in South Carolina through
Toys "R" Us, the court supports its analysis by finding that Geoffrey's
intangible assets are present in the state. The accrual of accounts receivable
and the presence of a trademark name seem odd bases upon which to establish
legislative jurisdiction.
In summary, the court's due process analysis seems in line with the
economic reality of Geoffrey's corporate structure. The question is whether
the court properly reached that result on its own, or whether the South
Carolina General Assembly first must act to extend the state's jurisdiction to
Geoffrey.
Finally, this case demonstrates the uncertainty created by the Quill
decision, through the Court's statement that physical presence never has been
required except for use taxes. The Supreme Court apparently believes
Congress should act in this area. Yet, Congress shows no indication of
changing the Supreme Court's previous enforcement role. Interstate
51. See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, 4.08[2] (noting that Justice Scalia
has challenged the notion that the Commerce Clause imposes limitations on a state's power to tax
in light of Congress' silence).
52. See Geoffrey, Inc., - S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 18 (citing 1 HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, 6.08 for the proposition that "[any corporation that regularly
exploits the markets of a State should be subject to its jurisdiction to impose an income or
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